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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studied the impact of financial participation in a sample of European 
publicly traded firms. Special attention is paid to the issue of complementarity 
between financial participation and other forms of participation. Our results suggest, 
consistently with the theoretical framework, that the returns to financial participation 
indeed depend on the level of participation in decision-making. In highly participatory 
firms, increasing financial participation clearly increases its efficacy. However, in 
firms where employee participation in decisions is low, increasing financial 
participation may even deteriorate outcomes or at best be ineffective. Similarly, 
increasing participation in decisions does not improve the outcomes of financial 
participation if financial participation is confined only to a narrow group of employees. 
Our results also suggest that there are significant differences between equity 
participation and profit-sharing. Increasing participation in equity has generally 
positive effects, while profit-sharing is effective only at highly participatory firms. 
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FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION AND PERFORMANCE: NEW 
SURVEY EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE 
Panu Kalmi, Andrew Pendleton, and Erik Poutsma a 
1.INTRODUCTION 
Despite the recent strong official encouragement of employee financial participation 
by the European Commission and the social partners (ECE, Unice), there is still 
relatively little European cross-national research on the effects of financial 
participation. The existing pan-European surveys often do not pay much attention to 
financial participation.1 Our paper aims to fill this gap by reporting the results from a 
new survey, specifically designed to capture the incidence and effects of financial 
participation and to explore the interrelationships between participation in decisions. 
Our survey includes data on six European Union countries (Finland, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK). 
 
We analyse the perceived effects from financial participation and what determines 
these perceptions. As we argue in the text, this strategy avoids some problems of 
causality that has plagued the earlier research. Our research strategy should be seen 
as complementary to the more established strategies. We also pay much attention to 
the issue of complementarities of financial participation with the participation in 
decisions, utilising our rich data on the use of various participatory practices among 
the respondents. In general, we find significant evidence supporting the contention 
that financial participation actually supports firm performance, and strong evidence 
on the type of complementarities discussed in earlier literature. 
 
Our work extends and goes beyond the earlier work on the relationships between 
financial participation and other forms of participation with the same data. Kalmi, 
                                            
a   Helsinki School of Economics, Finland; Business School, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK; 
PARTNER Research Group, Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University, Netherlands 
 
Contact: Erik Poutsma, Nijmegen School of Management, P.O. Box 9108, NL-6500 HK Nijmegen, 
The Netherlands, Tel +31 24 3615628, Fax +31 24 3611933, e.poutsma@nsm.kun.nl 
 
1  An example of this is the Cranet data that has however a limited set of variables on financial 
participation (see Pendleton et al., 2003). 
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Pendleton and Poutsma (2004) find that employees in profit-sharing firms have much 
more participation in decisions, while firms with equity schemes typically are not very 
participatory in other respects. In general, they find that the link between financial 
participation and participation in decisions is quite weak. However, in this paper we 
are able to show that complementarities actually matter a great deal on the perceived 
effects of financial participation. Moreover, we show that equity ownership produces 
benefits even at low level of participation in decisions, while profit-sharing is relatively 
ineffective unless coupled with high participation in decisions. Thus, our results 
provide a rationale to the somewhat puzzling findings in Kalmi, Pendleton and 
Poutsma (2004).  
 
2 LITERATURE ON THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION 
There is a substantial literature on the effects of financial participation (FP), and 
several useful surveys exist.2 Most of the literature falls into two groups. The 
economics literature usually augments the standard production function by including 
a variable representing financial participation, usually as a dummy variable denoting 
the existence of the plan, or using some size measure of the plan (percentage of total 
equity, proportion of pay, proportion of employees participating). A positive coefficient 
on this indicator is then interpreted as evidence on positive impact from financial 
participation.3 In the psychology and organisation studies literature, the focus is on 
the impact of ownership on attitudes. It is studied either by comparing owners and 
non-owners in an organisation or by studying the change in the attitudes following the 
adoption of ownership scheme.4 The surveys of the literature indicate that the 
majority of the studies find moderate positive effects from financial participation 
schemes. 
 
However, there are severe problems of causality, primarily because the effect of FP 
is observed only indirectly. These problems arise from the possibility that the decision 
                                            
2  For example, Jones, Kato and Pliskin (1997) survey the economic literature on profit-sharing, Kruse 
and Blasi (1997) survey the economics and the attitudinal literature on employee ownership, and 
Poutsma (2001) and Perotin and Robinson (2003) cover the literature on financial participation 
broadly. 
3  Examples of this literature include Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (1987) on European worker co-
operatives, Kruse (1992) on US profit-sharing, Kumbhakar and Dunbar (1993) on US ESOPs, and 
Jones and Kato (1995) on Japanese ESOPs.  
4  Examples of this kind of studies include Long (1978, 1982); Klein (1987), and Pendleton, Wilson 
and Wright (1998). 
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to introduce FP is itself endogenous to performance, or that the decision to introduce 
FP is correlated with another variable omitted in the empirical analysis, that 
simultaneously affect performance. The problem of causality is most obvious in 
cross-section analysis, where in the case of a positive correlation between FP and 
performance measure the causal direction cannot be determined. However, most of 
the economics literature has been able to use panel data. With panel data, the 
researchers can resort to “before and after” analyses of the impact of the FP on 
performance. Moreover, with the “fixed effects” methodology, the researchers are 
able to control for the impact of any omitted time-invariant variables. However, as 
Prendergast (1999, p. 41-43) argues, if the performance trend differs between the 
two group of firms for reasons that are unobservable to the econometrician, the 
standard fixed effects approach cannot detect this difference. One example is 
selection (Lazear, 1999): Employees may be more willing to purchase shares when 
they have private information that the firm performance is going to rise rapidly, but an 
econometrician to whom such information is unavailable, will mistakenly attribute the 
higher performance to FP.  
 
Another difficulty many studies on the FP face is omitted variable bias due to the 
omission of complementary participatory practices. The complementarity of financial 
participation and other forms of participation has been noted in several studies,5 but 
at the theoretical level it is perhaps most thoroughly studied by Ben-Ner and Jones 
(1995). Their main conclusion is that financial participation and participation in 
decision-making must be introduced as coherent bundles. The partial effects of 
increasing either financial participation or participation in decision-making may be 
negative, especially when the other component of participation is at a low level. 
Especially increasing participation in decision-making without financial participation 
can be detrimental, because employees gain access to strategic decisions and 
information, however without incentives to act in the best interest of the shareholders. 
Increased (direct) participation can also increase employee disutility of effort, if it 
involves work intensification. Increasing financial participation without participation in 
decision-making may not have strong negative effects, but to be just ineffective. In 
turn, combinations of financial participation and participation in decisions are likely to 
have positive effects on firm outcomes.6 
                                            
5  See e.g. Levine and Tyson (1990), Kandel and Lazear (1992); Levine (1995); Milgrom and Roberts 
(1995). 
6  According to Ben-Ner and Jones (1995), the optimal combination of financial participation and 
participation in decisions is to transfer both rights fully to employees, as is the case in some worker 
co-operatives. Nuti (2000) has argued that this model ignores finance considerations and argues for 
partial employee participation. However, for our purposes the most relevant observation in Ben-Ner 
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The empirical literature on the complementarities between FP and participation in 
decisions dates back at least to Cable and Fitzroy (1980), and there has been 
several studies since.7 Usually researchers have found that the omission of data of 
complementary participatory practices leads to considerable biases in the estimates 
of the financial participation. Unfortunately, this research has some limitations of its 
own. Often the data on other participation practices is only from one or two points of 
time, so the possibilities to study within-firm variation are limited. Due to the more 
costly data collection, the sample sizes remain often quite small. Finally, those 
studies that have been able to collect longer panels (Ichniowski, Shaw and 
Prennushi, 1997) or have had larger samples (Black and Lynch, 2001, others?) often 
have quite superficial information on financial participation, typically only dummy 
variables.  
 
While the research on individual employees have typically concentrated on subjective 
assessments (attitudes) rather than objective data (e.g. quits, wages), the firm-level 
research has typically concentrated on objective measures (e.g. productivity, 
profitability). However, Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) and McNabb and Whitfield 
(1998) use the British WIRS data to study the impact of FP on financial performance, 
using the manager’s subjective assessment as the dependent variable. In their work, 
the estimation approach is analogous to the studies using objective performance 
measures, in the sense that they also try to estimate the impact of FP indirectly, 
using measures of FP along with other regressors.  
 
The main difference between our study and the previous studies is that we address 
the issue of causality directly with our survey questions. A typical survey question 
would read: “How do you assess the impact of the scheme on the following items: to 
increase productivity”, on a scale from 1-5 where 1 denotes “no impact” and 5 “very 
successful” (0 if the aim is not relevant / applicable). Thus the outcome scores, to 
which we refer below as FP outcomes, describe the direct effect of financial 
participation on specific aims, rather than indirect effects used in other studies, that 
have to be estimated using regression techniques. We also regress the outcome 
scores with other variables representing FP and other participation measures, and 
other control variables, but the interpretation of these variables is slightly different. 
For instance, we find that the respondents with employee share schemes perceive 
                                                                                                                                        
and Jones is that due to complementarities, the partial effects of increasing one type of participation 
may be negative or positive, depending on the level of the other participation variable.  
7  See Conte and Svejnar (1988), Ichniowski, Prennushi and Shaw (1997); McNabb and Whitfield 
(1998), Black and Lynch (2001); and Conyon and Freeman (2002).  
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the effect of FP on employee motivation to be 3.6 (on a scale from 1 to 5). Without 
further analysis, we can conclude that share schemes do quite a good job in 
motivating employees. However, with regression analysis we can analyse further 
what characteristics of share schemes produce this effect. For instance, we find that 
increasing the participation rate in equity by 10 % and holding other variables 
constant (and participation score at its mean) increases the probability that a 
respondent evaluates the impact of FP scheme to motivation to be 4 instead of 3 by 
2.4 percentage points. Thus, while share schemes appear to motivate employees 
generally, firms with broader share schemes motivate their employees even more. 
 
The point is that our measures evade the problems of causality by addressing it 
directly in the survey questions. Thus we do not have the problem whether certain 
level of performance is attributable to financial participation or to other factors; our 
measures capture the impact of financial participation alone.8 To our knowledge, this 
solution to the problem of causality is novel, albeit straightforward. Furthermore, by 
including variables on the “depth” of participation (participation rates) as well as other 
measures of (complementary) participation we are able to study what determines the 
efficacy of FP schemes. 
 
Of course, this solution has some limitations. While our measures are well-suited to 
address problems such as “does financial participation have an effect?” and “what 
determines when the FP schemes work well?”, it does not address questions like “by 
how much does a 10 % increase in the profit-sharing participation rate increase 
productivity?”. Such questions can be answered only by objective data. One 
consequence of this limitation is that we cannot make any cost-benefit analysis of 
financial participation, since we cannot quantify the gains, nor the costs.9 
 
As in any subjective data, our dependent variables may be biased if the managers 
fail to answer truthfully, or if there are considerable differences in managerial 
conceptions on what constitutes a “successful” impact. However, also objective data 
faces such limitations, since varying accounting standards and practices also create 
distortions among accounting figures.10 There is also the problem whether a success 
(or failure) of a scheme with 5 % participation rate is comparable with the experience 
of a scheme with 100 % participation rate. It might well be the case that the 
organisational impact (e.g., on profits) of a successful scheme is larger when more 
                                            
8  In fact, measures of ”general performance” are not included in the data. 
9  However, such comparisons may already be implicit in the managerial responses. 
10 In cross-country studies such as ours, this problem is aggravated by national differences in 
accounting standards. 
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employees are involved, while a low participation rate may indicate that the aims 
were more limited to start with. However, since we have no possibilities to translate 
the impact of the scheme to organisational outcomes, we have to assume that the 
indicators are comparable.  
 
Finally, since our data is cross-sectional, there might also be selection issues. For 
instance, there might be firms that have experimented with FP schemes but have 
found the results disappointing and have discontinued the schemes. Since the 
sample used in this paper constitutes of only firms having some form of financial 
participation, such possibility would indicate that our estimates on the effect of FP are 
upward biased. 
3 DESCRIPTIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Data description 
 
Our sample consists of publicly traded firms in the six European Union member 
countries. These countries are Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and 
the UK. These countries represent the main geographical areas of the European 
Union. They also provide examples of countries where the use of financial 
participation has been longstanding (France, UK), or where it has become recently 
very popular (Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands), or where the use remains low 
(Spain). 
 
The data was collected by mail and telephone survey. A total of 869 firms were 
contacted. We focused on the companies that were listed in the stock exchange. For 
the two smaller lists, Helsinki and Amsterdam, we contacted all companies in the 
stock exchange. Concerning the other countries, we made a selection from the 
largest 200 companies. The survey consisted of a structured questionnaire. It asked 
for details of the plan and opinions of the respondent on results and obstacles. It was 
sent to the officer responsible for the management of the scheme or the human 
resource manager. The study has a national focus, and we did not include questions 
on global equity plan.  
 
To achieve a higher response rate, the respondents were also contacted by phone. 
Native speaking interviewers called the respondent after two weeks for reply. In this 
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case, interviewers made a computer-aided telephone interview. About half of the 
replies were received by phone interviews. Our aim was to get a response rate of 30 
%. In the end, we came very close to it, the response rate being 29.5 % and the 
actual number of firms in the sample being 256. The response rate remained low in 
Spain (18.1%), while it exceeded 30 % in the Netherlands and in the UK.  
 
Of the 256 respondents, 219 (86%) had some kind of financial participation scheme. 
Since our dependent variable is the perceived impact of FP schemes, this leads to 
censoring of firms that do not have any FP schemes. We checked for potential 
selection issues by running a logit model, where the dependent variable was 
inclusion to the data set. The regressors were log of employees, log of labour 
productivity, country dummies (UK omitted), and broad industry classification 
(information technology and telecommunications, other manufacturing, and services 
as an omitted category). The significant coefficients were for France (more likely to 
be included to the sample), Spain (less likely to be included), and as marginally 
significant the ICT industry dummy (more likely to be included). No significant impact 
from employment or labour productivity was detected. The increased probability of 
the French firms to be included is likely to be due to mandatory profit-sharing in 
France. The practical relevance of these concerns is that because of mandatory 
profit-sharing in France, the link from the performance of the FP schemes to 
selection into the sample is likely to be weaker in French firms, whereas in Spain it 
might be exceptionally strong (i.e. since financial participation is relatively uncommon 
in Spain, Spanish firms that actually practice it may be exceptionally motivated to 
operate the schemes). This would lead us to expect higher outcomes for Spanish 
firms and lower for French firms. 
 
3.2 Incidence of financial participation 
 
The types of financial participation we investigate can be divided into two broad 
groups: Share schemes and profit-sharing schemes. The difference between these 
schemes are that in share schemes the employee remuneration is tied to the 
development of company share performance, while in the profit-sharing schemes 
employee income depends on accounting profits. Our definition of share schemes is 
perhaps broader than it conventionally thought. We include not only share acquisition 
schemes (where employees or the employer may acquire shares on the behalf of 
employees), but also stock appreciation plans, convertible bonds, and stock options. 
Also our definition of profit-sharing is relatively broad, including also discretionary 
schemes that can be cancelled by the management at will.  
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Of the 219 firms in the sample, 61 % have a profit-sharing scheme, 81 % have a 
share scheme, and thus 42% have both types of schemes. Of the schemes, around 
70 % are broad-based, the highest proportion of broad-based schemes being in 
France (89%) and the lowest in Spain (29%).11  
 
We also collected data on different types of employee participation. These can be 
divided into direct (on-the-job) participation, and into indirect (representative) 
participation. To the first category belong teamwork, quality circles, suggestion 
schemes and employee surveys, while to the second category belong trade unions, 
board representation, and other forms of employee representation (work councils and 
joint management-employee committees). Table 1 shows the use of these methods. 
Clearly the most popular category is the “other forms of employee representation”, 
owing to the widespread use of work councils in many of the survey countries. Other 
methods were used in 27-42 % of the respondents, the second popular form of 
participation being “suggestion schemes” and the least common form being “board 
representation”. 
 
To construct a useful categorical variable for the statistical analysis of the impact of 
participation on financial participation outcomes, we performed a principal component 
analysis. The vector coefficients of the first principal component, that explains 30 % 
of the variance, are given in the Table 1. Notice that all coefficients are positive, 
indicating that the use of all practices is correlated. This is good news, since it means 
that the use of a practice always contributes positively to the first component. Thus, 
we may interpret the first principal component as a “participation score”. The 
strongest contributions to this score come from quality circles and suggestion 
schemes, while the impact of works councils and consulting committees (subsumed 
under “other forms of participation”) is weaker.  
 
As explained above, the respondents were asked to evaluate whether a given aim 
was relevant for the introduction of financial participation, and if so, how well the 
scheme is meeting the intended aims. In the questionnaire, we listed a number of 
potential aims of financial participation schemes that were chosen from the literature. 
The respondents may want to improve the enterprise performance (improve 
productivity). Some aims were more indirect and operating via an attitudinal change 
(promote identification with the company, improve work motivation, increase job 
                                            
11 Further details on the incidence of the schemes can be found in Kalmi, Pendleton and Poutsma 
(2004). 
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satisfaction, stimulate entrepreneurial attitudes). Some aims were related to desirable 
labour market outcomes (attract suitable recruits, reduce employee turnover). We 
also named some auxiliary aims (raise capital, inhibit take-overs, to show employees 
that the firm values them, to take advantage of tax concessions). 
 
In Table 2, column 1 lists the stated aims of financial participation. Column 2 gives 
the average scores, their standard deviation, and the percentage of respondents that 
stated that the aim was relevant in their organisation. If the respondent stated that 
the aim was not relevant, then it has been coded as missing. There are clear 
differences between the performance goals and the auxiliary aims in how the 
respondents perceive the relevance of the goal. The performance goals are clearly 
relevant to the vast majority of the firms: For each stated aim, more than 85 % of the 
respondents agree that the aim is relevant for their organisation. The most relevant 
goal is to improve motivation (97.4 % of the respondents mention this), while the 
least frequently mentioned among the performance goals is to improve productivity 
(86.6%). The auxiliary goals are clearly less often mentioned, with the exception of 
the statement “the company shows respect to its employees via financial 
participation”, that 96.3% of the respondents mention. The least frequent goal is to 
raise new capital, mentioned only by 41.3 % of the respondents.  
 
When we look at the success of the stated aims at the scale of 1-5, financial 
participation schemes seem to be most successful in promoting identification, 
improving motivation, and easing recruitment, where the average score is around 
3.5. The effects on job satisfaction and reducing labour turnover seem to be 
somewhat weaker (below 3). In general, these scores indicate that the majority of 
respondents believe that financial participation schemes have an effect on firm 
performance. Of the auxiliary aims, financial participation appears also to be very 
successful in conveying employees the message that the firms care about them. 
 
Again we resort to principal component analysis in creating a “financial participation 
outcome score” that describes how well the financial participation scheme meets the 
stated aims. We include only the performance goals to this score. The interpretation 
of this variable is that it describes the overall effect of financial participation in several 
objectives. Notice that to get a value of this score, a respondent must have stated 
that all the aims are relevant. If the score in any of the goals is missing, then the 
score value is also missing. For this reason, the number of respondents that have a 
value for the FP outcome score is reduced from 219 to 136.  
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We tested whether there were any differences between these two groups regarding 
the participation rates. It is possible that those respondents that operate more 
selective schemes also have fewer aims in their programme. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, there were no differences concerning the participation rate between 
these two groups. In both cases, the mean of participation rate was around 70 %. 
Secondly, we tested for the possibility that respondents who had not responded to 
some questions were more critical in other respects, in which case our FP outcome 
score may be biased. However, when we divided the data into two groups, to those 
who had the FP outcome score and to those for which it was missing, and compared 
the means of individual items between these two groups, absolutely no difference 
between these groups was detected. In 4 items the mean was higher for those who 
did not have the FP outcome score, and in 3 items for those that did have, but in 
none of the cases was the difference significant in pairwise t-tests.  
 
The coefficients of the first principal component are given in the right-most column 
(column 9). Again, all variables loading into the first component are correlated with 
each other, as indicated by the positive coefficients. The impact of the variables on 
the first component is quite even, motivation and recruitment getting highest scores 
and identification the lowest. The first principal component accounts for about 45 % 
of the explained variance. 
 
The bottom row shows the country-specific mean of the FP outcomes index. There is 
quite large variation. Apart from Spain that has only two observations, German 
respondents have the highest standardised score (1.07). The UK score is about 
average, France and Netherlands being slightly below the average, and Finland 
having the lowest score (-0.81).12 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the pairwise correlation between the FP outcome index and 
the participation index is negative (r= -0.13), although insignificant. On the other 
hand, the preliminary analysis suggests that there may be differences between 
respondents with profit-sharing schemes and respondents having equity schemes. 
The mean score of the FP outcome is 0.24 for firms with equity schemes, -0.16 for 
firms with profit-sharing schemes, and 0.21 for respondents having both equity and 
profit-sharing schemes. Among equity schemes, there does not appear to be 
                                            
12 While in theory the principal components should have a mean zero and standard deviation of 1, this 
happens in practice only if the principal components explain all the variance in the data, (i.e. the 
outcome variables can be represented as a linear combination of the explanatory variables). This is 
usually not the case, so in general the standard deviation of the principal components differs from 
one.  
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differences between firms with stock option and share acquisitions. However, these 
relationships are best studied by using multivariate econometric analysis. 
4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
We will proceed in the analysis in two stages. In the first stage, we will estimate how 
the equity and profit-sharing schemes influence the FP outcome score, and how 
these interact with participation variables. In the second stage, we take a closer look 
at the components of FP outcomes. However, it turns out that the impact on 
individual components is quite difficult to estimate, but there are often influences to 
the same direction, for which reason the results are more clear-cut for the aggregate 
score. Therefore, we spend more time with the results concerning the aggregate 
score, rather than with its components. 
 
Since the FP outcome index is a continuous and (approximately) normally distributed 
variable, ordinary linear regression analysis is applicable. We use the following 
regressors: To measure financial participation, we use the participation rate in equity 
ownership (PARTEQ) and the participation rate in profit-sharing (PARTPS). We have 
some information on the proportion of equity held by employees, but we have these 
figures only for share ownership, and we do not have comparable size measures for 
the other types of FP (stock options and profit-sharing). Thus we use only 
participation rates as measures of the FP intensity. We use the participation score 
(PARTSCORE), derived above, as the measure of the intensity of participation in 
decision-making.  
 
Each regression specification includes a fixed set of control variables, that include 
the log of the number of employees,13 and industry and country dummies. Services is 
the omitted industry, and the UK the omitted country. We also omit Spain since there 
are only two observations for Spain. The values of control variables are included to 
the regression output, since they may be of independent interest. Especially, the 
number of employees may be an important variable. The famous 1 / n hypothesis 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) would suggest that FP schemes would be ineffective in 
larger firms. However, this hypothesis is contradicted by the empirical regularity that 
mainly larger firms tend to adopt FP schemes (e.g. Jones, Kato and Pliskin, 1997). 
 
                                            
13 The mean (standard deviation) of employment for the firms used in the regression is 17,133 
(33,105) employees. The mean (standard deviation) of the log of employees is 7.62 (2.40). 
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In the first regression specification, we estimate the following equation: 
 
FP outcome score=β1∗PARTEQ+β2∗PARTPS+β3∗PARTSCORE+Σ(β(i)*CV(i))+ε, (1) 
 
where the betas denote the regression parameter coefficients, the last but one term 
is the summated effect of control variables, and ε is the error term. Thus the partial 
effect of increasing participation rate by one percentage point in equity (profit-
sharing) is just β1 (β2).   
 
The column 1 (C1), Table 3, gives the parameter coefficients and the associated t-
values for the equation (1). Of the primary parameters of interest, only β1 is 
significant. A one percentage point increase in participation in equity increases the 
FP outcome score by an estimated 0.009 units. Participation in profit-sharing has a 
slight negative effect that is insignificant. Likewise, participation score has a small 
and insignificant negative effect. Of the control variables, only the dummy for Finland 
is significant (negative), and only at the 10 % level. The overall regression 
diagnostics are not that great either: The null hypothesis that all the variables are 
jointly insignificant (F-test) is rejected at the 5 % level but not at the 1 % level., and 
there is some evidence that the variance of the error term may not be constant and 
the parameter coefficients are thus biased. The null hypothesis of constant variance 
is rejected at the 10 % level but not at the 5 % level.  
 
As discussed above, several studies have argued that the omissions of the 
interaction terms may lead to biased results, and we include the interaction terms to 
the specification 2. Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
 
FP outcome score=β1∗PARTEQ+β2∗PARTPS+β3∗PARTSCORE+ 
+β4∗PARTEQ*PARTSCORE+β5∗PARTPS*PARTSCORE+Σβ(i)*CV(i)+ε,  (2) 
 
The partial effects of PARTEQ and PARTPS are now slightly more complicated, 
since they now depend also on the level of PARTSCORE. The partial effect of 
increasing PARTEQ by one percentage point is now β1+β4∗PARTSCORE 
(analogously for PARTPS). Thus, the specification (2) is more flexible than 
specification (1) because it allows the partial effects to be positive and negative, 
depending on the complementary participation, consistently with the theoretical 
framework presented above.  
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To go to the actual parameter estimates, we notice that the parameter coefficients for 
PARTEQ and PARTPS remain quite stable, but the parameter coefficient for 
PARTSCORE changes drastically from -0.091 to -0.470. The effect of PARTSCORE 
is now negative and significant at the 5 % level. However, the interaction terms 
β4 and β5 are positive, although only β5 (the interaction between profit-sharing and 
participation score) is significant. In general, the coefficients suggest that the effect of 
participation in decision-making, when combined only with very low levels of financial 
participation, decreases the FP outcomes.14 However, at high levels of financial 
participation, the interaction terms reverse the impact and increasing participation in 
decision-making actually increases the FP outcomes. Similarly, for profit-sharing the 
results imply that at low levels of participation in decision-making, the impact of 
increasing profit-sharing on targeted outcomes is negative or at best zero. Only at 
relatively participatory firms, increases in profit-sharing will enhance goals. The 
situation is different for equity ownership, because here the coefficients suggest that 
at very low levels of participation the impact of increasing equity ownership is 
practically zero, while already at moderate levels of participation the impact of 
increasing equity participation rates is strongly positive. The two forms of financial 
participation thus appear to have somewhat different effects here. Also the overall 
regression diagnostics are improved: The null hypothesis of joint insignificance is 
rejected now at the 1 % level as well (although at admittedly small margin), and the 
null hypothesis of the constant variance of the error term is clearly not rejected.  
 
The positive coefficients of the interaction terms mean that at firms with low 
participation (where PARTSCORE is negative), increasing financial participation has 
detrimental outcomes on goal attainment, whereas increasing financial participation 
in highly participatory firms has positive consequences. Although this is consistent 
with the Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) framework, the possibility remains that the 
relationship is in reality asymmetric: The complementarity might be important at high 
levels of participation, but at low levels of participation FP is just ineffective. One way 
to test this is to create instead of two interaction variables, four variables: The 
variable PARTEQ*PARTSCORE(+) equals PARTEQ*PARTSCORE for observations 
with positive values of PARTSCORE (above average participation in decisions) and 
zero if PARTSCORE is negative, while the variable PARTEQ*PARTSCORE(-) equals 
PARTEQ*PARTSCORE if PARTSCORE is negative, and zero otherwise (similarly for 
PARTPS*PARTSCORE). The results are shown in column 3 (we omit the regression 
                                            
14 Notice that this does not necessarily mean that increasing participation in decisions at low levels of 
financial participation necessarily decreases firm performance. The negative coefficient rather 
means that the FP schemes become less effective in meeting the desired goals. 
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equations from now on). While the coefficients are to the same direction as before, it 
is notable that the coefficient for PARTEQ decreases and is no longer significant. 
While the coefficients for interaction variables support the argument outlined above 
(coefficients for the highly participatory firms increase and the interaction effects for 
the low participation firms are virtually zero), the t-values for the interaction terms 
decrease slightly (even for positive values). Also the F-test statistics decreases 
slightly, and there is again some evidence on heteroskedasticity, so the specification 
(3) does not appear to be preferable to the specification (2), although the “asymmetry 
in complementarities” argument cannot be rejected either. 
 
Another concern is about the complementarity between equity ownership and profit-
sharing. Is it plausible that at high levels of participation, firms can improve the 
outcomes by increasing both equity ownership and profit-sharing, as the coefficients 
in the specification (2) suggest? In effect, the question is whether equity ownership 
and profit-sharing are substitutes, or complements. An initial answer to this is to look 
at whether the high rates of profit-sharing and equity schemes tend to coexist in 
practice. A high negative correlation between these two variables would suggest that 
they are substitutes, while a high positive correlation would suggest that they are 
complements. In reality the correlation coefficient r is -0.077, so the actual correlation 
does not support either hypothesis.  
 
We try two different specifications to address this issue. In the specification (4), we 
test whether the financial participation effect can be represented by a single variable. 
We combine the participation rates of equity schemes and profit-sharing into a single 
variable PARTCOMB, that is equal to the higher value of PARTEQ or PARTPS. As 
above, we also include an interaction term between PARTCOMB and PARTSCORE. 
However, this strategy clearly does not work, since none of the coefficients of primary 
interest is significant, and the overall statistic deteriorates. There is clearly some 
value of keeping the two forms of financial participation separate.  
 
The complementarity can be better addressed by including a interaction variable 
between the two forms of financial participation, so interacting PARTEQ with 
PARTPS. The results of this specification, reported in column (5), turn out to be 
interesting. First, the coefficient for PARTEQ nearly doubles. The coefficient for 
PARTPS changes to positive, although it is insignificant. The coefficients of 
PARTSCORE remains negative, significant, and approximately at the same size as 
before. Both interactions between financial participation and participation in decisions 
remain positive, and approximately of similar size than before. The new interaction 
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term, PARTEQ*PARTPS is negative, but insignificant (with a t-value -1.38). There is 
thus some, although insignificant, evidence that profit-sharing and equity ownership 
are to some degree substitutes.  
 
It is not trivial to determine whether the specification 2 or the specification 5 is 
preferable. The overall test statistics are quite similar, so they do not provide a basis 
to discriminate against the other. In the remaining ordered logit regressions we are 
going to use the specification 2. This is mainly because the results without the added 
interaction term are easier to interpret. Furthermore, since the coefficient of the extra 
interaction term is insignificant, there is no strong case for arguing that profit-sharing 
and equity ownership are substitutes. It is comforting that the substantive results are 
little affected, whether we choose one or the other. 
 
When we look at the control variables, the only variable that emerges as significant is 
the dummy for Finland. For some reason, the effects of financial participation in 
Finland are consistently below that of the UK and most other countries. The negative 
sign on the LOGEMP variable suggests that financial participation schemes may be 
more effective in smaller firms, but the effect is not statistically significant. 
 
In Table 4, we show the results disaggregating for individual goals. Since each 
dependent variable takes values from 1 to 5, ordered logit is applicable. In Table 4 
we present the logit coefficients. Positive values indicate increased probability of an 
observation getting higher values of the outcome variable. We do not comment on 
the size of the effects, but rather concentrate on the sign and the significance of the 
effects. The effects of the variables are mostly jointly significant: only once (job 
satisfaction) the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level of 
significance. The strongest finding from Table 4 is that increasing participation in 
equity enhances the attainment of the goals of financial participation in all respects, 
and in four of the cases it is significant. Other effects are not as clear. Participation 
score gets consistently negative coefficients, but the coefficient is significant only 
twice (motivation and retention). The coefficient between profit-sharing and 
participation is consistently positive, but it is nowhere significant. The coefficient 
between equity schemes and participation is positive and significant once 
(productivity), but on the other hand, it is twice negative (although insignificant). The 
effect of profit-sharing alone is also unclear: it is twice negative and (marginally) 
significant (motivation and retention), but it gets also positive values.  
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Of the control variables, the number of employees is twice negative and significant 
(productivity and satisfaction), but surprisingly, it is also once positive and significant 
(identification). The dummy for Finland is consistently negative and twice significant 
(identification and retention). The dummy for Germany is mostly positive and three 
times significant (productivity, recruitment, and entrepreneurship), but it also once 
negative and significant (retention), for which reason probably it was not significant in 
the OLS regressions. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have studied the impact of financial participation in a sample of 
European publicly traded firms. Two features of our data set differentiate our work 
from previous work. First, ours is the first European cross-national survey on financial 
participation practices. Our results thus have higher generalisability than previous 
studies that have typically looked at the effects in one country only. Secondly, our 
survey addresses the typical problems of causality by asking about the causal 
relations from financial participation to performance directly in the questionnaire. In 
our regression analysis, we study what factors influence the attainment of the goals 
of financial participation.  
 
We pay special attention to the issue of complementarity between financial 
participation and other forms of participation. In the previous research, it has been 
argued that omission of other forms of participation may lead to substantial omitted 
variable bias. The research has generally found that the returns to one component of 
participation are higher when the other component of participation is also high. Ben-
Ner and Jones (1995) suggest that increasing one type of participation when one 
type of participation is low may lead to negative effects.  
 
Our data is well suited to account for these questions, since we have detailed data on 
both financial participation and participation in decision-making. We use principal 
component analysis in constructing scores for financial participation outcomes and 
participation in decisions. Our results suggest, consistently with the theoretical 
framework, that the returns to financial participation indeed depend on the level of 
participation in decision-making. In highly participatory firms, increasing financial 
participation clearly increases its efficacy. However, in firms where employee 
participation in decisions is low, increasing financial participation may even 
deteriorate outcomes or at best be ineffective. Similarly, increasing participation in 
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decisions does not improve the outcomes of financial participation if financial 
participation is confined only to a narrow group of employees. Our results also 
suggest that there are significant differences between equity participation and profit-
sharing. Increasing participation in equity has generally positive effects, while profit-
sharing is effective only at highly participatory firms.  
 
What do our results imply for the further development of financial participation in the 
European Union countries? As Kalmi, Pendleton and Poutsma (2004) note, there is 
evidence that the equity schemes are increasing much faster than the previously 
predominant profit-sharing schemes. Since our results indicate the equity schemes 
generally are more strongly associated with positive outcomes, this development 
seems to be conducive to efficiency. Kalmi, Pendleton and Poutsma (2004) show 
further that profit-sharing firms are generally more participatory than equity-sharing 
firms. This also makes sense since our results suggest that a positive pay-off from 
profit-sharing is conditional to high participation, while equity ownership brings 
benefits already at relatively low level of participation. However, our results also 
indicate that also equity-sharing firms could improve their performance at an 
increasing rate if they also adopted more participatory approach in general. This may 
the most important future challenge for European firms wishing to develop their 
financial participation and thereby increase firm performance. 
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Table 1: The use of different forms of employee participation 
 
1. Participatory practice 2. Total 3.  Loading coefficients 
to the first principal 
component 
Teamwork 64 
(30.3%) 
0.287 
Quality circle 66 
(31.3%) 
0.536 
Suggestion scheme 89 
(42.2%) 
0.502 
Employee survey 85 
(40.3%) 
0.362 
Trade union  84 
(39.8%) 
0.305 
Board representation 57 
(27.0%) 
0.344 
Other employee participation (incl. 
work councils) 
160 
(76.2%) 
0.192 
 
Notes: In the column 2, the number of observations with a given participatory practices is indicated.  
In parenthesis the percentage of observations with an given practices relative to the total number of 
observations is indicated. In the column 3, the vector coefficients of the first principal component of 
the participation index is indicated. 
 
  
Table 2: The performance outcomes of the financial participation schemes 
     
1. Aim 2. All 
(N=219) 
3. 
Netherlands 
(N=58) 
4. 
France 
(N=27) 
5. UK  
(N=53) 
6. 
Finland 
(N=36) 
7. Spain 
(N=7) 
 
8. 
Germany 
(N=38) 
9.Outcome 
score 
coefficient 
Increase 
productivity 
3.09 
(1.12) 
[86.6%] 
2.64 
(1.23) 
 
3.20 
(1.37) 
3.27 
(0.96) 
2.90 
(0.96) 
3.25 
(0.50) 
3.61 
(0.99) 
0.378 
Ease recruitment 3.41 
(1.09) 
[92.1%] 
3.42 
(0.99) 
3.67 
(1.07) 
3.40 
(1.14) 
2.77 
(1.17) 
3.20 
(1.30) 
3.97 
(0.76) 
0.436 
Improve 
motivation 
3.53 
(0.81) 
[97.4%] 
3.36 
(0.94) 
4.00 
(0.71) 
3.53 
(0.63) 
3.23 
(0.92) 
3.38 
(0.41) 
3.75 
(0.62) 
0.437 
Promote 
identification 
3.57 
(1.05) 
[96.3%] 
3.49 
(1.15) 
3.42 
(1.26) 
3.84 
(0.89) 
2.81 
(0.85) 
4.17 
(0.75) 
4.06 
(0.36) 
0.262 
Increase job 
satisfaction 
2.99 
(1.13) 
[89.1%] 
3.18 
(0.98) 
2.18 
(1.27) 
2.74 
(1.21) 
3.03 
(1.10) 
3.00 
(1.41) 
3.27 
(1.11) 
0.380 
Stimulate 
entrepreneurship 
3.15 
(1.20) 
[94.1%] 
3.23 
(1.20) 
3.76 
(1.03) 
2.59 
(1.09) 
2.53 
(1.25) 
3.20 
(0.84) 
4.03 
(0.60) 
0.370 
Reduce labour 
turnover 
2.87 
(1.21) 
[91.4%] 
2.94 
(1.23) 
2.94 
(1.34) 
3.05 
(1.24) 
2.50 
(1.29) 
3.33 
(0.58) 
2.77 
(1.02) 
0.357 
Raise new capital 2.43 
(1.44) 
[41.9%] 
1.92 
(1.32) 
3.58 
(1.51) 
2.00 
(1.45) 
2.15 
(1.27) 
1.50 
(0.71) 
3.08 
(1.12) 
 
Provide pension 
assistance 
2.41 
(1.42) 
[66.8%] 
2.06 
(1.41) 
3.29 
(1.27) 
2.21 
(1.40) 
1.38 
(0.80) 
2.00 
(1.73) 
3.36 
(1.16) 
 
Inhibit take-overs 1.73 
(1.15) 
[52.5%] 
1.78 
(1.24) 
2.11 
(1.36) 
1.73 
(1.20) 
1.32 
(0.75) 
1.00 
(0) 
2.05 
(1.21) 
 
Show respect to 
employees 
3.65 
(0.87) 
[96.3%] 
3.49 
(1.02) 
4.00 
(0.77) 
3.89 
(0.61) 
3.28 
(0.85) 
3.66 
(0.55) 
3.75 
(0.80) 
 
Take advantage 
of tax 
concessions 
3.09 
(1.41) 
[66.7%] 
3.00 
(1.46) 
4.20 
(0.77) 
3.59 
(1.29) 
1.53 
(0.96) 
3.00 
(0) 
3.16 
(1.07) 
 
Mean (std) [N] of 
the outcome 
score 
0.000 
(1.781) 
[136] 
-0.192 
(1.941) 
[42] 
-0.220 
(1.264) 
[9] 
0.031 
(1.435) 
[31] 
-0.814 
(2.031) 
[26] 
1.203 
(0.472) 
[2] 
1.070 
(1.330) 
[26] 
 
      
Notes: The column 2 gives the mean scores on different statements for the entire sample. The 
number in round parenthesis is standard deviation. The number in cornered brackets is the 
percentage of respondents to whom the given question is relevant. Columns 3-8 give the mean and 
standard deviation for individual countries. Column 9 displayes the principal component loadings 
for different performance goals. The bottom row describes the mean of FP outcome score for the 
sample and for different countries. The number in round brackets is the standard deviation, and the 
number in cornered brackets is the number of respondents with non-missing values of this score.
  
Table 3: Effects of participation on financial participation outcome index (OLS estimates) 
 
Independent variables C1. FP outcome 
score 
C2. FP outcome 
score 
C3. FP outcome 
score 
C4. FP outcome 
score 
C5. FP outcome 
score 
PARTEQ 0.009** 
(2.05) 
0.009** 
(2.03) 
0.006 
(0.78) 
 0.017** 
(2.33) 
PARTPS -0.001 
(-0.30) 
-0.002 
(-0.68) 
-0.007 
(-1.08) 
 0.003 
(0.54) 
PARTCOMB    0.005 
(1.04) 
 
PARTSCORE -0.091 
(-0.73) 
-0.470** 
(-2.10) 
-0.472** 
(-2.11) 
-0.361 
(-1.37) 
-0.443** 
(-1.98) 
PARTEQ* 
PARTSCORE 
 0.004 
(1.30) 
  0.005 
(1.37) 
PARTPS* 
PARTSCORE 
 0.005* 
(1.94) 
  0.004* 
(1.67) 
PARTCOMB* 
PARTSCORE 
   0.003 
(1.03) 
 
PARTEQ* 
PARTSCORE(+) 
  0.007 
(1.29) 
  
PARTEQ* 
PARTSCORE(-) 
  0.001 
(0.23) 
  
PARTPS* 
PARTSCORE(+) 
  0.007* 
(1.84) 
  
PARTPS* 
PARTSCORE(-) 
  -0.001 
(-0.13) 
  
PARTEQ* 
PARTPS 
    -0.0001 
(-1.38) 
LNEMP -0.073 
(-0.86) 
-0.075 
(-0.88) 
-0.082 
(-0.97) 
-0.123 
(-1.47) 
-0.048 
(-0.57) 
ICT -0.291 
(-0.65) 
-0.384 
(-0.86) 
-0.411 
(-0.92) 
-0.091 
(-0.21) 
-0.426 
(-0.95) 
MANUFACT -0.165 
(-0.47) 
-0.244 
(-0.70) 
-0.197 
(-0.56) 
-0.135 
(-0.38) 
-0.224 
(-0.64) 
NETHERLANDS -0.349 
(-0.77) 
-0.362 
(-0.80) 
-0.568 
(-1.20) 
-0.584 
(-1.32) 
-0.359 
(-0.80) 
FRANCE -0.697 
(-1.01) 
-0.446 
(-0.64) 
-0.577 
(-0.83) 
-0.899 
(-1.31) 
-0.411 
(-0.59) 
FINLAND -1.072* 
(-1.96) 
-1.058* 
(-1.94) 
-1.298** 
(-2.25) 
-1.381** 
(-2.54) 
-1.089** 
(-2.00) 
GERMANY 0.748 
(1.59) 
0.580 
(1.23) 
0.370 
(0.75) 
0.668 
(1.38) 
0.586 
(1.25) 
Intercept 0.763 
(0.84) 
0.925 
(1.03) 
1.092 
(1.21) 
1.241 
(1.33) 
0.377 
(0.38) 
Nr of observations 114 114 114 114 114 
F-test 2.35** 2.38*** 2.23** 2.15** 2.36*** 
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.128 0.133 0.092 0.136 
Breusch-Pagan test 
for heteroskedasticity 
3.43* 1.30 3.14** 1.62 1.81 
Notes: The parameter coefficients are OLS estimates, t-values in parenthesis. Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5 %, *** 1 
% 
  
Table 4: Effects of participation on performance at disaggregated level: ordered logit estimates 
 
Independent 
variables 
Productivity Recruitment Motivation Identification Satisfaction Entrepreneur-
ship 
Retention 
PARTEQ 0.007 
(1.43) 
0.018*** 
(3.45) 
0.013** 
(2.53) 
0.023*** 
(4.38) 
0.006 
(1.18) 
0.012*** 
(2.59) 
0.005 
(1.04) 
PARTPS 0.003 
(0.82) 
-0.007* 
(-1.68) 
0.002 
(0.49) 
-0.005 
(-1.18) 
0.003 
(0.85) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.007* 
(-1.84) 
PARTSCORE -0.300 
(-1.31) 
-0.304 
(-1.25) 
-0.526** 
(-2.26) 
-0.024 
(-0.11) 
-0.284 
(-1.12) 
-0.131 
(-0.58) 
-0.439** 
(-1.96) 
PARTEQ* 
PARTSCORE 
0.007* 
(1.85) 
0.0003 
(0.07) 
0.005 
(1.41) 
-0.003 
(-0.88) 
0.004 
(1.10) 
-0.001 
(-0.41) 
0.005 
(1.41) 
PARTPS* 
PARTSCORE 
0.001 
(0.49) 
0.003 
(1.02) 
0.004 
(1.59) 
0.003 
(1.20) 
0.003 
(1.08) 
0.003 
(1.00) 
0.003 
(1.13) 
LOGEMP -0.191** 
(-2.05) 
0.028 
(0.32) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.190** 
(2.19) 
-0.178** 
(-2.07) 
-0.010 
(-0.13) 
-0.062 
(0.470) 
ICT  -0.759 
(-1.48) 
-0.504 
(-0.97) 
-0.395 
(-0.78) 
-0.932* 
(-1.83) 
-0.027 
(-0.05) 
-0.408 
(-0.84) 
-0.387 
(-0.85) 
MANU -0.768* 
(-1.88) 
-0.835** 
(-2.06) 
-0.087 
(-0.22) 
-0.412 
(-1.11) 
0.045 
(0.12) 
0.404 
(1.10) 
-0.549 
(-1.51) 
NETHER-
LANDS 
-1.172** 
(-2.35) 
0.123 
(0.26) 
-0.202 
(-0.43) 
-0.041 
(-0.08) 
0.185 
(0.40) 
1.097** 
(2.41) 
-0.517 
(-1.12) 
FRANCE -0.329 
(-0.44) 
1.149 
(1.45) 
1.278* 
(1.78) 
-0.083 
(-0.12) 
-1.763** 
(-2.22) 
1.899*** 
(2.85) 
-0.055 
(-0.08) 
FINLAND -0.961 
(-1.60) 
-0.733 
(-1.21) 
-0.272 
(-0.45) 
-1.382** 
(-2.29) 
-0.319 
(-0.54) 
-0.132 
(-0.22) 
-1.122* 
(-1.78) 
GERMANY 0.974* 
(1.84) 
1.351** 
(2.35) 
0.768 
(1.41) 
0.421 
(0.80) 
0.559 
(1.05) 
2.160*** 
(4.21) 
-0.907* 
(-1.87) 
Nr of 
observations 
136 147 156 156 136 149 143 
LR chi2 30.81*** 42.60*** 25.94** 53.85*** 17.95 40.79*** 21.30** 
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.118 0.076 0.135 0.048 0.099 0.050 
   
Notes: The parameter coefficients are the raw ordered logit coefficients. z-values in parenthesis. 
Significance levels: *** 1 % , ** 5 % , * 10 %. 
 
Previously published Working Papers: 
 
An up-to-date list of working papers can be found at: http://iira.fh-bad-honnef.com 
 
No. Author(s) Title Date 
13 Nash, D. A Receipe for Creating Resentment and Dissatisfaction: A  
Study of Payment Systems in Investment Banking  
09/2004 
12 Procter, S., 
Burridge, M.  
Extent, Intensity, and Context: Teamworking and     
Performance in the 1998 UK Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey (WERS98) 
09/2004 
11 Marsden, D. The Role of Performance Related Pay in Renegotiating the 
‘Effort Bargain’: The Case of the British Public Service 
09/2004 
10 Galang, M. C.  High Performance Work Systems and Organisational 
Performance: A Six-Country Study 
09/2004 
09 van Veldhoven, M., 
Verhagen, M. 
The Relationship Between Employee Survey Data And 
Performance: A Longitudinal Study Using Multiple Types Of 
Outcomes 
09/2004 
08 Thompson, M., 
Heron, P. 
Management Capability And High Performance Work 
Organization 
09/2004 
07 Heffernan, M., 
Dundon, T. 
High Performance Work Systems and Employee Outcomes: 
Rebalancing the Argument 
09/2004 
06 Kalmi, P., 
Pendleton, A., 
Poutsma, E. 
Financial Participation And Performance: New Survey   
Evidence From Europe 
09/2004 
05 Stavrou, E., 
Brewster , C., 
Charalambous, C. 
Human Resource Management As A Competitive Tool In 
Europe 
09/2004 
04 Bacon, N.,    
Blyton, P. 
Does Co-operation to Negotiate High Performance Work 
Practices Pay for Unions? 
09/2004 
03 McNabb, R., 
Whitfield, K. 
Does Pay-for-Performance Pay?: Incentive Pay, Employee 
Participation and Earnings 
09/2004 
02 Kinnie, N., Swart, 
J., Rayton, B., 
Hutchinson, S., 
Purcell, J. 
HR Policy and Performance: An Occupational Analysis  09/2004 
01 Boselie, P., 
Paauwe, J. 
HRM and Performance: What’s next? 09/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
